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INTRODUCTION
At first glance, patent law and disasters seem unlikely bedfellows. It is
true that the United States Patent and Trademark Office (hereafter
"USPTO") is no stranger to disaster, having suffered its own "Great
Patent Fire of 1836. ' ' l However, disasters such as the September 11,
2001 ("9/11") terrorist attacks, the Southeast Asian Tsunami of 2004,
and Hurricane Katrina do not immediately evoke images of the patent
system. When members of the armed forces, police, firefighters,
medical workers, relief workers, and other emergency response
personnel rush to the aid of disaster survivors, one does not expect
them to be joined by teams of emergency patent personnel.
Nevertheless, the patent system does play a pivotal role in allowing
1 See, e.g., United States Patent and Trademark Office, Kids' Pages,
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ahrpa/opa/kids/special!1836fire.htm (last visited
Jan. 28, 2007).
[Vol. 10.3:309
PATENTS TO THE RESCUE
society to prepare for, react to, mitigate, learn from, and even prevent
2disasters.
The patent system is useful in disasters in a number of very
different ways. At the most fundamental level, the economic incentive
provided to inventors by the prospect of patent protection greatly spurs
innovation that can enhance the general technological capacity of
society. But for the availability of patent protection, the baseline level
of technology available to society would be much lower. A lower level
of technological capacity tends to lower the ability of society to deal
effectively with disasters. The patent system can also be harnessed to
produce innovations that enhance the specific technological capacity of
society to face particular challenges arising out of disasters.
Technological innovations such as medicines to treat anthrax,
engineering materials to strengthen dike-walls, and methods of more
rapidly and effectively evacuating large numbers of people can all be
specifically promoted through the patent system by adjusting its
various incentives. If necessary, it is even possible to weaken, suspend,
or even abrogate patent rights to allow easier access to vital patented
technologies in disasters.
In assessing what roles the patent system might usefully play
in disasters, it is important to integrate a number of significant factors
that vary by disaster. The patent system may apply differently to
disasters that are foreseeable than to disasters that are unforeseeable
surprises. Ensuring the continued enhancement of both general
technological capacity and specific technological capacity is important
because the options society has in dealing with disasters of all types
tend to improve alongside additional technological innovation.
Additionally, any immediate compromises to patent rights necessitated
by urgent needs arising from disasters must be balanced against
prospective interests of ensuring that the patent system continues to
provide incentives to spur sufficient future innovation. Policy choices
about patent rights in the present will always have consequences for
both the patent system and the technological capacity of society well
into the future.
This Article assesses the role of the patent system in disasters,
and suggests that this role is vital. The Article begins by presenting an
overview of the United States patent system. It discusses the taxonomy
of disasters, dividing them into foreseeable disasters and unforeseeable,
2 Throughout this article the phrases "in disaster(s)," "to disaster(s)," and "with
disaster(s)" are used as shorthand to encompasses any and all of these disaster-related
activities.
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or surprise, disasters. Then, it outlines the various legal options
available in international and U.S. patent law for the patent system to
react to disasters. These options include exceptions to infringement,
compulsory licensing, march-in rights, patent breaking, and sovereign
immunity. Finally, this Article proposes legal frameworks through
which patent law can react rapidly and effectively to foreseeable and
surprise disasters, respectively, while preserving prospective incentives
to spur future technological innovation and ensure future enhancement
of the technological capacity of society.
With care and planning, a delicate balance can be struck
between the exigencies that occur as a result of disasters in the present
and the continued capacity of the patent system to contribute new
technological solutions useful in future disasters.
I. PATENT LAW
A. The Patent Bargain
Society generally abhors monopolies, and much economic theory
justifies policies, such as antitrust laws, that oppose them. A monopoly
in a particular good or service will tend to cause a deadweight loss to
society due to inefficiently low output of that good or service.3 Even in
the realm of technical innovation, where patents allow monopoly rights
of exclusion to their owners, critics have long advocated free access as
preferable to monopolies. A prodigious inventor himself, Benjamin
Franklin wrote that "[as] we enjoy great advantages from the
Inventions of others, we should be glad of an Opportunity to serve
others by any Invention of ours; and this we should do freely and
generously."4 Nevertheless, the monopoly right to exclude others given
to the owner of a patent represents a clear exception to the general legal
presumption that monopolies should be discouraged.
Patents may be tolerated by society because they are widely
considered to create incentives for innovation by rewarding inventors
for their efforts. To justify receipt of monopoly rights in an invention
an inventor must provide society with full disclosure of that invention
to "add to society's storehouse [of knowledge]."5  In many
3 N. GREGORY MANKIW, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICs 326-334 (3d ed. 2004).
4 BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 112 (1909).
5 In re Argoudelis, 434 F.2d 1390, 1394 (C.C.P.A. 1970) (Baldwin, J., concurring).
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technological arts 6 this bargain may be fairly struck, with both patent
owners and society benefiting equitably. However, many critics
complain that in some technological arts, such as biotechnology,
inventors add too little to the storehouse of knowledge to justify the
grant of a monopoly.
7
The high quality of information disclosed to the public by
inventors seeking patent rights enhances the technological and
scientific capacity of society. Society can use this information for any
purpose it chooses except to make, use, sell, offer to sell, or import a
claimed invention.8 This information enriches the existing body of
technological and scientific knowledge, allowing scientists and
engineers to build further upon new ideas to create even newer, and
increasingly advantageous, ideas. If scientists make progress by
standing on the shoulders of giants, then the incentives provided by the
patent system contribute additional shoulders on which to stand.
Furthermore, many new innovations are invented as a result of
attempts to develop solutions to existing technological challenges.
Thus, the products of the inventive process tend to be useful and
practically applicable. Disasters often present technological challenges
of a practical nature, such as how to protect populations against disease,
how to transport supplies through difficult terrain, and how to rebuild
infrastructure rapidly and efficiently. The patent system is thus very
well placed to develop and deliver solutions to the challenges posed by
disasters.
B. Patentable Subject Matter
Myriad inventions can be useful in preparing for, enduring, mitigating,
or reacting to disasters. New medicines, methods of treatment,
methods of diagnosis, and medical devices are of potential benefit
during public health disasters. New protective structures, engineering
techniques, and materials, and means of transportation can assist in
preventing and mitigating disasters. Even new methods of
6 in the language of patent law, "art" means field or area. For example, propellers,
wings, and fuselages are all items one might encounter in the aeronautical arts,
whereas legs, seats, struts, and backs would belong to the chair-making arts. With
respect to natural biochemicals, genes, polypeptides, carbohydrates, and lipids would
be considered subjects of the biochemical or biotechnological arts.
7 See, e.g., Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter
Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698, 698-
701(1998).
8 See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2002) (describing content and term of patents).
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organization, evacuation, and logistics can assist in responding
effectively, efficiently, and rapidly to disasters. Patent law is generally
permissive regarding what categories of technology are eligible for
patent protection, allowing inventors to seek patent rights covering a
tremendous diversity of inventions. Almost any invention with
relevance to disasters, whether a drug, building material, food, or
method is patentable subject matter.
A particular category of disaster, crude oil spills, inspired an
invention that probed the limits of what subject matter is and is not
eligible for patent protection. Anand Chakrabarty, a professor of
biology at the University of Illinois, genetically engineered a
Pseudomonas bacterium to enable it to metabolize hydrocarbons.
9
Chakrabarty intended that his new bacterium could be introduced into a
crude oil spill, where, having an abundant hydrocarbon food source, it
could reproduce exponentially and consume the oil.'0 Thus, the toxic
environmental effects of spilled crude oil could be minimized.
Chakrabarty applied for a utility patent in the United States Patent and
Trademark Office ("USPTO"), claiming his genetically-engineered
bacterium." However, the USPTO examiner declined to grant him a
patent on his invention on the grounds that living organisms constituted
unpatentable subject matter.12
Chakrabarty appealed this rejection to the Board of Patent
Appeals and Interferences ("BPAI"), a USPTO administrative court,
which affirmed the examiner's rejection on the ground that living
organisms were ineligible for patent protection.' 3 In 1980, after an
appeal to the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals ("CCPA"), the U.S.
Supreme Court held in favor of Chakrabarty.14 By its decision, the
Supreme Court sanctioned recognition of a significant broadening of
the scope of patentable subject matter. In a famous statement, the
Supreme Court described as patentable "anything under the sun that is
made by man.'' 15 Because the bacterium at issue had been genetically
engineered, and was not merely a product of nature, it was eligible for
patent protection. Later judicial and administrative decisions further
defined the broad borders of the patentable world to include
9 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 305 (1980).
0Id.
Id.
12 Id. at 306.
13 Id.
14 Id. at 306-309.
15 Id. at 309.
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multicellular organisms, 16 plants, 17 mammals, 18 computer software, 19
and even methods of doing business.
20
Currently, almost any kind of invention with conceivable use in
disasters would be eligible for patent protection in the United States.
C. Patent Requirements
The Patent Acte' imposes a number of statutory requirements that patent
applications must meet before they can mature into valid patents.
Some of these requirements are largely procedural, but several are
substantive. The most significant of the latter are legal requirements of
novelty,22 nonobviousness,23 utility, 4 and disclosure.25  A patent
applicant must also provide a precise description in the patent
"claims ' 26 of the metes and bounds of the invention for which patent
protection is sought.
1. Novelty and Nonobviousness
The common purpose of the novelty and nonobviousness requirements
is to ensure that any invention on which a patent applicant receives a
patent, which confers a powerful monopoly right to exclude others, is
truly a new contribution to society. Otherwise, the patent applicant
receives a doubly unjustified windfall: a valuable right to exclude
society retroactively from practicing an "invention" it was previously
able to practice in return for disclosing to society previously known
information about the "invention." The novelty and nonobviousness
requirements ensure that, once an invention enters the public domain, it
cannot be secondarily clawed back into the realm of private property.
2. Utility
16 Ex Parte Allen, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d 1425, 1426 (Bd. Pat. App. & Interferences 1987).
17 J.E.M. Ag. Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 124 (2001).
18 E.g., Transgenic Non-Human Mammals, U.S. Patent No. 4,736,866 (issued Apr.
12, 1988).
19 Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 196 (1981).
20 State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1375
(Fed. Cir. 1998).
21 35 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).
22 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2002).
23 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2004).
24 35 U.S.C. § 101.
2' 35 U.S.C. § 112.
26 Id.
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In order to obtain a patent claiming an invention, an applicant must
disclose to the public, as represented by the USPTO, a sufficiently
detailed description of the invention.27 The precise requirements of this
disclosure requirement are set out in the Patent Act at the first
paragraph of 35 U.S.C. §112:
The specification shall contain a written description of the
invention, and of the manner of making and using it, in
such full and clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable
any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with
which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the
same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the
inventor of carrying out his invention.28
The disclosure requirement reflects the bargain between
inventor and society that is fundamental to the patent grant. In return
for monopoly rights to exclude others from making, using, offering to
sell, or selling the patented invention within the United States, or
importing the patented invention into the United States, 29 the patentee
contributes new information to the public storehouse of knowledge.
Although such information may be of limited immediate usefulness
because the patent owner retains the right to exclude others during the
term of a patent, a patent's teachings immediately provide society with
new knowledge or techniques. These new teachings may help other
inventors to develop other, unrelated inventions, improvements on the
claimed invention, or noninfringing alternatives that directly compete
with the claimed invention. 30 In addition, once the patent term expires,
so does the patent owner's right to exclude others from freely
practicing the claimed invention. 3 1  The disclosure requirement
vouchsafes the fairness of the bargain between inventor and society by
ensuring that sufficient high-quality information is provided to the
public storehouse of knowledge to justify toleration of the deadweight
loss to society caused by the monopoly exclusion right. As the
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 35 U.S.C. § 27 1(a) (2003).
30 Note that these informational amenities all lessen the deadweight loss to society
incurred by the monopoly exclusion rights conferred by the patent grant.
"1 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) ("[The patent] grant shall be for a term beginning on the date
on which the patent issues and ending 20 years from the date on which the application
for the patent was filed in the United States...").
[Vol. 10.3:309
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Supreme Court has stated, the disclosure requirement is "the quid pro
quo of the right to exclude."
32
3. Disclosure
Among the rights a patent confers to the patentee is the right to exclude
others from making, using, selling, offering to sell, or importing the
claimed invention during the term of the patent or from inducing or
contributing to such infringement.33  The term of a patent generally
extends twenty years from the filing date of the patent application. 34 In
return for the limited monopoly right to exclude, an inventor must
provide the public with a full description, or "specification," of the
claimed invention.
The first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. §112 includes three distinct
requirements that the specification of a patent application must satisfy
in order for a patent claim to satisfy the disclosure requirement: written
description, enablement, and best mode. 35
An applicant for a patent must provide "a written description of
the invention. 3 6 This written description requirement serves a notice
function, by providing the public with a specific indication of what the
inventor considers the limits on his invention to be. Additionally, it
establishes precisely what inventions an inventor possessed as of the
date on which the patent application was filed, which limits the
inventor from pursuing post hoc claims on inventions not disclosed in
the patent application as originally filed.
The best mode requirement forces the inventor to disclose the
best way of practicing a claimed invention known to the inventor at the
time the patent application is filed. A unique peculiarity of the United
States patent system, this subjective requirement aims to ensure that the
public storehouse of knowledge receives the highest possible quality of
information, rather than only the minimum amount of information
necessary to enable a claimed invention.37 Beyond acting as a barrier
32 J.E.M. Ag Supply, 534 U.S. at 142 (quoting Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416
U.S. 470, 484 (1974)).
13 35 U.S.C. § 27 1(a).
34 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2).
" 35 U.S.C. § 112.36 id.
37 Without the best mode requirement, an inventor might be tempted to provide the
bare minimum of information necessary to enable a person of skill in the art to
practice the invention in some manner, while allowing the inventor to preserve the
best manner of practicing it as a trade secret.
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to receiving a patent in the first instance, failure to disclose the best
mode in a patent application can later render claims in a granted patent
invalid.
The enablement requirement represents the very core of the
patent bargain, and is "arguably the most important patent doctrine
after obviousness." 38  It is crucial for ensuring that society receives
more than a de minimus description of inventions in exchange for
tolerating the monopoly rights to exclude others granted to inventors.39
One of the paramount purposes of the enablement requirement is
to provide the assurance that the public will, in fact, receive
something in return for the patent grant. This consideration
is, of course, the full and complete disclosure of how to
make and use the claimed invention. Thus, the patent adds
a measure of worthwhile knowledge to the public
storehouse. The incentive to give this added measure of
knowledge to the public, which clearly promotes the
progress of the "Useful Arts," is the primary justification
for the existence of the patent system.40
To be enabled, the written description 4 1 of an invention must
disclose "the manner of making and using it, in such full and clear,
concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to
which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make
and use the same.",42 Furthermore, as explained in In re Wright,
[although] not explicitly stated in section 112, to be
enabling, the specification of a patent must teach those
skilled in the art how to make and use the full scope of the
claimed invention without "undue experimentation.
'
"
43
38 Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe, Inc., 323 F.3d 956, 982 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (Radar,
J., dissenting).
39 In economic terms, the enablement requirement, along with the written description
and best mode requirements, may be viewed as attempts to minimize the deadweight
loss to society attending the monopoly right to exclude conferred by a patent.
40 In re Argoudelis, 434 F.2d at 1394 (Baldwin, J., concurring).
4 1 Not to be confused with the "written description" requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112,
is the "written description" of the patent application (or patent), which traditionally
consists of specification and "original claims" (that is, the first version of the claims
filed). Drawings and other appendices filed along with the patent application are
considered to complement the written description.
42 35 U.S.C. § 112.
43 In re Wright, 999 F.2d 1557, 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
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And, deciding what level of experimentation is undue "requires the
application of a standard of reasonableness, having due regard for the
nature of the invention and the state of the art. [Citations omitted]" 44
4. Claims
The specification must also include "one or more claims particularly
pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the
applicant regards as his invention."'45 These claims provide notice to
the public about where the monopoly rights to exclude lie, thus
allowing them to order their behavior so as not to infringe. The claims
also allow the patent owner to police instances of infringement by
comparing the elements in a particular claim to allegedly infringing
devices or methods.
D. Practical Aspects of the Patent System
There are a number of practical, but salient, aspects of patents that are
relevant to the role the patent system can play in disasters. First,
patents are expensive to obtain. On average, an applicant for a patent
pertaining to a complex technology will spend more than $11,000
simply to file a patent application,46 and, after filing, considerably more
to obtain enforceable patent rights.47 The examination system of the
USPTO, where patent applications are examined by technically skilled
examiners before a patent can issue, acts relatively slowly. Patent
prosecution (the process through which a patent application must pass
prior to issuance as a patent) generally takes from two and a half to five
48years, with the duration of prosecution rising with the complexity of
the technology involved.
44 In re Wands, 858 F.2d. 731, 737 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
4 35 U.S.C. § 112.
46 Thomas C. Fiala & Jon E. Wright, Preparing and Prosecuting a Patent that Holds
up in Litigation, 875 PLIIPAT 515, 521-22 (2006) ("For example, based on the
AIPLA Report of the Economic Survey 2005, the average expected charge in 2004
for preparing and filing a utility patent application was $11,218 for a relatively
complex electrical or computer application and $12,373 for a relatively complex
biotechnology/chemical application").
47 Interview with Craig Smith, Partner, Fish & Richardson P.C. (Mar. 5, 2007).
48 Id. The USPTO Performance Report for fiscal year 2006 reports an average patent
pendency time (defined as time from filing until patent issued or application
abandoned by applicant) of 31.3 months and shows that this figure has been
20071
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Once a patent is actually issued by the USPTO, the term of a
patent is almost always significantly less than the theoretical twenty-
year term because of time spent in patent prosecution or regulatory
approval. Even with patent term extension to compensate for
unreasonable federal agency review, the average enforceable lifetime of
a patent lasts only about fifteen to seventeen and a half years. If a
patent owner decides to enforce the right to exclude others from
making, using, selling, offering to sell, or importing a patented
invention, the average cost of patent litigation can rise above $5
million, depending on the amount of damages at issue. 49 Additionally,
patent litigation involves a significant degree of unpredictability, at
least in part due to the proliferation of judicial barriers and available
defenses to patent infringement.5 °
increasing over the past few years. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, DEP'T OF
COMMERCE, PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT: FIsCAL YEAR 2006, at
22 (2006), available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/annual/index.html
(last visited March 7, 2007) [hereinafter "PERFORMANCE AND
ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT"]. However, the average pendency times estimated
by the USPTO are likely underestimates. Kristen Osenga, Entrance Ramps, Tolls,
and Express Lanes-Proposals for Decreasing Traffic Congestion in the Patent
Office, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 119, 129-30 (2005) ("[T]he average prosecution (or
pendency) time for an ultimately successful patent is 3.6 years, with a median of 2.7
years. Anecdotally, the time period from filing to issuance varies by technology and
ranges from twenty-four to thirty-six months for chemical and mechanical arts and
thirty-six to sixty months for electrical and software arts").
49 Thomas C. Fiala & Jon E. Wright, Preparing and Prosecuting a Patent that Holds
up in Litigation, 875 PLI/PAT 515, 522 (2006) ("In comparison, the average
estimated costs associated with litigating a patent in 2005 as reported by the same
survey [AIPLA Report of the Economic Survey 2005] were: $769,562 for a patent
infringement suit in which less than $1 million was at risk; $2,637,179 for a suit in
which between $1 and $25 million was at risk; and $5,175,753 for a suit in which
more than $25 million was at risk").
50 See, e.g., David J.F. Gross et al., Claim Construction, Patent Infringement, and the
Growing Importance of the Claim Vitiation Defense, 841 PLIJPAT 45 (2005) ("This
paper reviews the basic principles of claim construction and then discusses the current
status of the doctrine of equivalents. As explained below, the Federal Circuit has
erected several independent barriers to finding infringement under the doctrine of
equivalents, but the most foreboding of such barriers may be the doctrine of claim
vitiation."); Douglas R. Nemec, Current Trends in Equitable Defenses to Patent
Infringement: Prosecution Laches and Inequitable Conduct, 804 PLIIPAT 1147, 1155
(2004) ("This article also compares several recent Federal Circuit decisions on
inequitable conduct, and explores how these cases, together with Symbol
Technologies, suggest an inclination by the Federal Circuit toward more vigorous
policing and enforcement of the rules of conduct before the PTO").
[Vol. 10.3:309
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Finally, patent rights themselves have attracted an increasing
amount of controversy among the public in recent years. With regard
to disasters, an irony attending this controversy is that the most
controversial inventions, such as patented medicines, biotechnological
inventions, and methods of doing business, are precisely the kind of
innovations most likely to prove useful in disasters.
E. Purpose of the Patent System
Legal authority for a patent system is based within the United States
Constitution. Specifically, Article 1, Sec. 8, clause 8 states that "The
Congress shall have power... to promote the progress of science and
useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the
exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries.
51
Congress has relied on this explicit constitutional authority to offer
statutory patent protection for inventions since the original Patent Act
of 1790.52
"[To] promote progress of science and the useful arts," the
availability of patent protection provides an incentive for inventors to
invest their valuable time and efforts on the development of
technological innovations. By virtue of the monopoly right that a
patent confers, investments in developing new and useful compositions,
devices, and methods can yield profits because inventors can exclude
all others from making, using, selling, offering to sell, or importing
their inventions for a substantial period of time. A particular fiscal
advantage of this incentive system is that Congress need not offer
inventors any financial reward for developing innovations because,
based on the right to exclude others, patent owners can directly extract
monopoly rents from consumers wishing to practice patented
inventions. Though monopoly pricing does inflict a deadweight loss on
society, the monopoly endures only for a limited period of time, after
which competition can drive down prices. Furthermore, the
specification of the patent delivers informational benefits to society as
soon as it is published.53
II. DISASTERS AND TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION
5' U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
52 Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109 (1790).
51 See 35 U.S.C. § 122(b) (2000) (discussing how publication of a patent application
generally occurs approximately 18 months after the filing date of the patent
application).
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A. Taxonomy of Disasters
Disasters comprise a diverse set of phenomena. Some are natural.
These include earthquakes, tornados, hurricanes, and extreme weather
events. Other disasters are anthropogenic. Military strikes, bombings,
and bioterrorism attacks all fall within this latter category.
In considering the role of the patent system preparing for and
reacting to disasters, it is important to differentiate between disasters
that are foreseeable and those that are unforeseeable surprises.
Foreseeability has two distinct aspects. A temporal aspect involves
how early a disaster can be predicted before it occurs. An
informational aspect involves how much reliable information is known
about the disaster before it occurs.
The most foreseeable of disasters are those that can be predicted
long ahead of time and about which much reliable information is
known. Such disasters can be described as "more foreseeable." As the
early predictability of a disaster and the amount of reliable information
known about the disaster decline, foreseeability also decreases. These
disasters can be described as "less foreseeable." When a disaster
cannot be predicted ahead of its occurrence, and no reliable information
is known about the disaster, it is unforeseeable. These disasters can be
described as "surprises," consistent with the nomenclature developed
by William Clark and Robert Kates.5 4 The ways in which the patent
system can assist society in disasters vary depending upon whether a
disaster is more foreseeable, less foreseeable, or a surprise.
Obviously, the patent system has the best potential to help
society with more foreseeable disasters. When a disaster is predictable
and well understood, existing incentives created by the prospect of
patent protection for inventions will tend to augment the general
technological capacity of society.55  Furthermore, with warning and
knowledge, society can target certain technological challenges likely to
accompany a particular disaster by increasing patent incentives so as to
54 Robert W. Kates & William C. Clark, Expecting the Environmental Surprise, 38
ENVIRONMENT 6-11 (1996).
55 Although general technological capacity will tend to increase over time, at least in
part in response to incentives created by the prospect of patent protection, this
increase will not tend to be uniformly distributed across all technological fields
because of variations in market demand for different categories of goods and services.
However, more foreseeable disasters should create more demand for goods and
services considered useful in the coming disaster, thus increasing incentives and
spurring inventive activity to produce goods and services to meet increased demand.
[Vol. 10.3:309
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spur technological innovations useful for meeting these challenges. As
a result, there will tend to be an increase in technological capacity
specific to the approaching disaster.
The patent system will also tend to increase general
technological capacity prior to a less foreseeable disaster." As a
simple function of time, the longer the period of time separating
recognition of an approaching disaster from its occurrence, the more
opportunity there is to increase this general technological capacity.
However, the less advance warning and reliable information there is
prior to a disaster, the less opportunity there will be for increasing
specific technological capacity.
Surprise disasters present a very different set of challenges to
the patent system. With no opportunity to prepare for them, the only
prospective contribution the patent system can make to surprise
disasters is to enhance the general technological capacity of society.
However, unlike for the case of both more and less foreseeable
disasters, such enhancement of general technological capacity will be
entirely unfocused with respect to any specific societal needs arising
from the surprise disaster. In the absence of reliable information the
market lacks any demand signals regarding which sorts of goods and
services will be most useful in the approaching disaster.
The spread of avian influenza ("bird flu") into North America
provides a useful illustration of a relatively foreseeable public health
disaster. The family of viruses that cause bird flu is well characterized.
The vectors that spread bird flu-usually domestic, rather than wild,
birds-are well understood. The devastating public health effects of a
bird flu outbreak have already been previewed in several well-studied
outbreaks in Southeast Asia. Bird flu has yet to spread widely into the
North America, despite the common Arctic breeding grounds many
Asian and North American migratory birds share in summer.57  The
spread of bird flu into North America will likely come from imported
poultry or poultry products. 58 The patent system has already been
spurred to action by the prospect of lucrative inventions offering
diagnostic methods, preventive methods and products, and treatment
56 Less foreseeable disasters are less likely to provide accurate signals to the market
regarding what sorts of goods and services will be most useful in the approaching
disaster because there is less reliable information available about the disaster.
57 Andrew Bridges, Avian Flu Not Spread by Bird Migration, available at
http://www.livescience.com/humanbiology/051228_apmigrate-flu.html. (last visited
Jan. 30, 2007)
58 Id.
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options for bird flu. 5 9  More inventions such as these increase the
chances of mitigating any public health disaster eventually resulting
from an outbreak of bird flu in North America. In short, there has
already been a relatively large amount of time and information about
bird flu, allowing enhancement of both general and specific
technological capacity prior to any North American bird flu disaster.
60
The sudden appearance of AIDS in 1981, and its subsequent
spread around the world, illustrates the phenomenon of a surprise
disaster. The origins of HIV-1, the virus responsible for AIDS, appear
to have been among wild chimpanzees in Africa.61 The virus was
probably transmitted to humans in Africa through the ingestion of
chimpanzee meat.62 Subsequently, HIV- 1 was spread among Africans,
and then around the world, most commonly by unprotected sexualintercourse. 63 Because of the relatively long period of time between
infection by HIV-1 and the development of obvious symptoms of
AIDS,64 the disease was difficult to diagnose and its pandemic spread
impossible to prevent. Complete lack of knowledge about AIDS before
it spread to humans coupled with the rapid development of the disease
into a global pandemic resulted in a surprise public health disaster.
There was little that could have been done prior to 1981 to prepare for
AIDS. Because of the incentives to invent created by the patent
system, the general technological-including medical--capacity of
society was greater than it otherwise would have been. However,
59 Of the eighty-three published patent applications that mention "H5N1," thirty-eight
(or forty-six percent) were published in 2006 alone. By contrast, only fifteen patents
mentioning "H5NI" have been issued by the United States Patent & Trademark
Office to date. See U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Patent Application Full Text and
Image Database, at http://appftl.uspto.gov/netahtmlUPTO/search-bool.html (last
visited Jan. 30, 2007) (showing databases of published patent applications); US Patent
Full-Text and Image Database, http://patfl.uspto.gov/netahtml/PTO/search-bool.html
(last visited Jan. 30, 2007) (showing databases of issued patents). Given the eighteen
month waiting period before a patent application is published, this probably
underestimates recent patenting activity in the area of bird flu.
60 Obviously, the more time and information society possess ahead of a foreseeable
disaster, the greater the probability that the disaster can be avoided.
61 NIAID-Supported Scientists Discover Origin of HIV-1, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF
ALLERGY AND INFECTIOUS DISEASES, Jan. 1999, at
http://www3.niaid.nih.gov/news/newsreleases/1999/hivorigin.htm (last visited Jan.
30, 2007).
62 Id.
63 HIV Infection and AIDS: An Overview, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF ALLERGY AND
INFECTIOUS DISEASES, Mar. 2005, at http://www.niaid.nih.gov/factsheets/hivinf.htm
(last visited Jan. 30, 2007).
64 id.
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without any information about AIDS or warning that it might appear,
the patent system was unable to enhance the specific technological
capacity of society to meet the challenges of the AIDS disaster ahead of
time, with devastating results to public health and the economy.
In short, the patent system can provide society with significant
enhancements in both general and specific technological capacity
useful in preparing for and reacting to foreseeable disasters, and does
so in rough proportion to the foreseeability of the disaster. However, in
the face of surprise disasters, the patent system is largely powerless to
provide anything other than enhanced general technological capacity.
B. The Patent System and Technological Innovation
Technological innovation has tremendous positive effects upon public
health, the economy, and the technological capacity of society to deal
with disasters. In fact, if research into historical economic growth by a
Nobel laureate economist, Robert M. Solow, is indicative of recent
trends, investments into developing new technologies may be
responsible for roughly half of the economic growth in the United
States. 65 Furthermore, there is little evidence of theoretical limits to the
economic benefits of increasing levels of technological innovation:
empirically, as investments in technological innovation increase,
economic growth increases without a declining return on investment.
66
Economic welfare appears to continue increasing indefinitely alongside
technological innovation.
67
Patent protection enhances technological capacity by creating
an incentive for inventors to devote their valuable and scarce inventive
resources to the search for technological and scientific innovations. In
the absence of patent protection, any innovation that does not remain
secret can potentially be freely appropriated by others. 68 Consequently,
unless such free-riding is prevented, and inventors are given the
prospect of compensation for their investment of scarce time, energy,
and other resources that make inventions possible, fewer inventors than
the socially optimal number will choose to invent, resulting in less
65 See Robert M. Solow, Technical Change and the Aggregate Production Function,
39 REVIEW OF ECON. & STAT 312, 319-322 (1957).
66 Paul M. Romer, Increasing Return and Long-run Growth, 94 J. POL. ECON. 1002
(1986).
67 See, e.g., FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, To PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER
BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY 74 (Oct. 2003)
[hereinafter "FTC REPORT"].
68 See id.
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innovation than is socially optimal. 69 Patent protection for inventions
helps to internalize the externalities caused by free-riding, and creates
an incentive to innovate.
70
With respect to disasters, the patent system provides society
with a significant benefit. It creates incentives for inventors to seek out
technical and scientific solutions to significant problems. In a general
way, the patent system induces inventors to build up the technological
and scientific capacity of society. Since inventors have the prospect of
financial reward for their innovations, society will tend to have more
inventors, developing more technological innovations, than there would
be in the absence of a patent system.
The patent system may be harnessed to seek solutions to
challenges specific to disasters, as long as such solutions hold the
promise of financial reward. For example, the 9/11 attacks have
highlighted the need for enhanced security screening, airplane safety
systems, and structural improvements to skyscrapers. The post 9/11
anthrax attacks showed the need for better diagnostic and therapeutic
solutions to respond to bioterrorism, and the Asian tsunami of 2004 and
the 2005 Hurricane Katrina both demonstrated the acute need for
improvements in early detection of natural disasters, emergency
response to sudden and widespread public health challenges, and
engineering of shelters and barriers.
In addition to enhancing the technological capacity of society to
deal effectively with disasters, the patent system can be adapted,
through the temporary weakening of patent rights, to allow rapid
dissemination and employment of inventions needed in disasters.
III. WEAKENING PATENT RIGHTS
In times of disaster society may decide that threats to public health,
safety, and property outweigh enforcement of some existing laws.
Much of the latest and more advanced technology that is, or could be,
useful in disasters will tend to be protected by patents against
unauthorized use. However, in the extreme situations that attend
disasters, one policy choice available to the government is to increase
the availability of needed, but patented, technologies through the
weakening or abrogation of patent rights.
69 id.
70 id.
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A number of international patent law treaties contemplate the
use of compulsory licenses to gain access to patented technologies
during national emergencies. Patent law in the United States also
includes a variety of legal avenues through which the right of a patent
owner to exclude others may be overridden to make needed patented
technologies available in extremis. Weakening of patent rights can be
accomplished by statutory exceptions to infringement, compulsory
licensing, march-in rights, patent breaking, and sovereign immunity.
Despite the availability of these legal options for avoiding infringement
liability, the U.S. government rarely avails itself of them.
In times of disasters, it may become necessary to weaken
existing patent rights in order to make useful technologies immediately
and widely available. During a disaster, the patent right to exclude
others tends to hamper, rather than help, disaster preparation and relief.
Even worse, if patent owners were to perceive a rise in their bargaining
power during a disaster, it might be economically rational for them to
engage in extortionate pricing practices with captive markets in need of
particular patented inventions to deal with the disaster. If society were
in dire need of a particular invention in a disaster, then a hold-out
situation might ensue, resulting in either an especially large deadweight
loss to society arising from the need to pay the extortionate price
demanded, or in a reduced capacity to respond effectively to the
disaster if the patent owner decided strictly to exercise the right to
exclude others.
Fortunately a number of legal options already exist to exclude
certain parties from infringement and to weaken the patent right to
exclude when necessary to do so.
A. The Patent Exclusionary Right
The rights conferred by a patent are often misunderstood. While it is
accurate that a patent confers a monopoly right to its owner, this
monopoly right is not absolute. Fundamentally, a patent gives its
owner the legal right to exclude others, but grants the patent owner no
affirmative right to practice. Other than the patent owner, "whoever
without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented
invention, within the United States or imports into the United States
any patented invention during the term of the patent therefore, infringes
2007]
DEPAUL JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW
the patent.",71 However, a patent owner possesses no affirmative right
to practice a patented invention, and may also be precluded from
practicing a patented invention, due either to the risk of infringing other
patents or to other legal restrictions on activities necessary to practice
the patented invention.
In addition, the right to exclude conferred by a patent does not
last forever. It expires along with the patent. Furthermore, because
patent prosecution can stretch over a considerable period of years, a
patent owner may have to wait a considerable period of time before a
patent becomes enforceable. Approximately eighteen months after its
earliest priority date, a published patent application carries with it
certain "provisional rights," including the possibility of a reasonable
royalty to compensate for pre-grant infringement of a claimed
72invention. However, the right to exclude others from practicing a
patent does not vest until the patent has actually been issued.
Consequently, the term of a patent tends to be considerably less than its
theoretical length of twenty years.
B. International Law and Weakening Patent Rights
Several international treaties legally constrain the policy options
available to the United States with respect to weakening or abrogating
patent rights. The most notable of these treaties are the Paris
Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property ("Paris
Convention"), 73  the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property ("TRIPS"),74 which is ancillary to the World
Trade Organization ("WTO"), and the North American Free Trade
Agreement ("NAFTA").75 In essence, these treaties attempt to ensure a
modicum of uniformity in the availability and enforcement of patent
rights in the national laws of all nations that are parties to them. In
addition to the protection of patent rights, all three treaties provide for
weakening of patent rights under exigent circumstances. The United
States has traditionally been a strong supporter of patent rights, in both
71 35 U.S.C. § 271(a).
72 35 U.S.C. § 154(d).
73 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883
;hereinafter "Paris Convention"].
4 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IC
art. 30, 1869 U.N.T.S. 229, 33 I.L.M 1197 (1994) [hereinafter "TRIPS"].
75 North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M.
289 (1993) [hereinafter "NAFTA"].
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the domestic and international arenas, and the United States has rarely
made use of the legal exceptions to patent rights allowed in these
treaties.
1. The Paris Convention
The Paris Convention sets out rules for the granting of compulsory
licenses. Article 5(A), entitled "Patents: Importation of Articles;
Failure to Work or Insufficient Working; Compulsory Licenses," states
that:
Each country of the Union shall have the right to take
legislative measures providing for the grant of compulsory
licenses to prevent the abuses which might result from the
exercise of the exclusive rights conferred by the patent...76
However, the circumstances under which a country may force a
compulsory license for a patented invention from its owner are
restrictive.
Efforts by a patent owner to exclude others completely from
practicing a patented invention necessary to protect public health,
safety, or property in a disaster may qualify as an abuse. Even
unreasonable exclusion might qualify as abuse. In the face of abuse,
the Paris Convention authorizes the federal government to force a
compulsory license with the patent owner.77 The availability of a
compulsory license may be necessary to curb the temptation on the part
of patent owners to engage in hold-out behavior to extort excessive
rents in return for access to patented inventions. Even the threat of a
compulsory license may be enough to temper such excesses.
Even once the federal government decides to force a
compulsory license from a patent owner for "failure to work or
insufficient working" of a patented invention, the Paris Convention
only permits it to do so for patents of a certain age. 78 Compulsory
licenses can be granted only after a "period of four years from the date
76 Paris Convention, supra note 73, art. 5(A)(2).
77 Id.
71 Id. art. 5(A)(4). If the ground of abuse justifying grant of a compulsory license is
other than "failure to work or insufficient working", then a compulsory license may
be immediately grantable. For example, a patent owner might work the patent
vigorously, but exclude others completely from the patented invention, either by
refusing to sell access to it or holding out for an unreasonably exorbitant price. Id.
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of filing of the patent application or three years from the date of the
grant of the patent, whichever period expires last.",79  The average
duration of prosecution of a patent application in the USPTO may
approach four years. 80  Thus, the- average waiting period for a
compulsory license may approach seven years from the filing date of
the patent. Furthermore, as long as a patent application is still
undergoing prosecution, and has not yet been issued by the USPTO,
anyone can practice its claimed inventions. 81 Even if a patent owner
fails to work a patented invention sufficiently, "it shall be refused if the
patentee justifies his inaction by legitimate reasons. 82 Additionally,
any compulsory license that is granted must be nonexclusive and
nontransferable.
8 3
During a disaster, the need for access to a patented invention
must often be met without unreasonable delay or impediment to protect
health, safety, or property from harm. Under the Paris Convention,
unreasonable delay or impediment in gaining access to a patented
invention needed to prevent significant harm, if caused by the patent
owner, might qualify as an "abuse" justifying a compulsory license. If
the ground of abuse justifying the grant of a compulsory license were
other than "failure to work or insufficient working," then the Paris
Convention would appear to allow the immediate granting of a
compulsory license. A situation justifying immediate grant of a
compulsory license might arise if a patent owner did, in fact, work a
patent vigorously, but chose to exclude others completely from the
patented invention, either by refusing to sell access to it or holding out
for an unreasonably exorbitant price in return for access. Alternatively,
if a patent owner were simply incapable of meeting a rapid increase in
demand driven by a disaster, failure to meet emergency demand while
excluding others from assisting to do so, rather than failure to work,
might also constitute abuse justifying a compulsory license.
Complete forfeiture or revocation of patent rights is also
contemplated by the Paris Convention. 84 However, complete forfeiture
79 Id.
80 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT, supra note 48. However,
the average pendency times estimated by the USPTO are likely underestimates.
Osenga, supra note 48, at 129.
81 Although no injunctive relief is available to the owner of a patent application, pre-
issue use of the claimed invention might trigger liability for a reasonable royalty
under 35 U.S.C. § 154(d).
82 Paris Convention, supra note 73, art. 5(A)(4).
83 id.
84 Id. art. 5(A)(3).
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or revocation is impermissible unless compulsory licensing would not
have prevented the abuse of patent rights.8 5 Even then, an attempt must
first be made to prevent the abuse through compulsory licensing,
because no forfeiture or revocation proceedings are permitted to begin
until at least two years after the first compulsory license has been
granted.86
2. TRIPS
The United States is a member of the WTO,87 whose TRIPS legally
obliges members of the WTO to provide for a uniform minimum level
of intellectual property protection. 88 Nevertheless, the provisions of
TRIPS also contemplate exceptions to the strict enforcement of patents
in exigent circumstances, including circumstances that might threaten
social welfare and public health. In particular, TRIPS Articles 7, 8, 30,
and 31 allow member governments to make exceptions to patent rights.
In Articles 7 and 8, TRIPS describes the general circumstances
under which exceptions to patent rights may be permitted. They
articulate the "Objectives"8 9 and "Principles" 90 of TRIPS, and explicitly
account for social welfare, in general, and public health, in particular,
both of which tend to be strongly implicated in disasters. Among other
considerations, member nations are urged to protect and enforce patent
rights "in a manner conducive to social and economic welfare, and to a
balance of rights and obligations." 9 1 Members are permitted to "adopt
measures necessary to protect public health and nutrition. . . provided
that such measures are consistent with the provisions of this
Agreement."
92
Article 30, entitled "Exceptions to Rights Conferred," allows
member nations to "provide limited exceptions to the exclusive rights
85 id.
86 id.
87 Understanding The WTO: The Organization, WORLD TRADE ORG., Jan. 11, 2007,
at http://www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/whatis e/tif e/org6_e.htm (last visited Jan.
30, 2007).
88 Intellectual Property: Protection and Enforcement, WORLD TRADE ORG., at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/whatise/tif e/agrm7e.htm (last visited Jan.
30, 2007).
89 TRIPS, supra note 74, art. 7.
90 Id. art. 8.
9' Id. art. 7.
92 Id. art. 8.
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conferred by a patent." 93 However, exceptions to patent rights must be
made without unreasonably conflicting with "normal exploitation of the
patent." 94  Nor can exceptions allowed by a member nation
"unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the patent owner." 95
Finally, exceptions to patent rights must account for "the legitimate
interests of third parties., 96  Article 30 does not authorize either
compulsory licensing or patent breaking, but rather, it allows member
nations to stipulate that some specified uses of patented inventions do
not constitute infringement.
Article 31, entitled "Other Use Without Authorization of
the Right Holder," allows member nations to grant
compulsory licenses or break patents in certain, usually
exigent, circumstances. To qualify, a member nation must
have a basis in its own laws for allowing use "by the
government or third parties authorized by the government"
of a patented invention without permission from the patent
owner. 97  In addition, a member nation must follow a
number of principles before authorizing the weakening of a
particular patent. 98 Each case for weakening patent rights
must be "considered on its individual merits. " Prior to
authorization, an effort must be made to obtain permission
from the patent owner "on reasonable commercial terms
and conditions" over a "reasonable period of time,"
although such negotiation with the patent owner is
unnecessary "in the case of a national emergency or other
circumstances of extreme urgency or in cases of public
noncommercial use."100  The scope and duration of use
"shall be limited to the purpose for which it was
authorized."'' Consistent with the Paris Convention, any
compulsory license must be nonexclusive and essentially
nontransferable. 10 2 Authorization extends "predominantly
9' Id. art. 30.
94 Id.
95 id.
96 Id.
" Id. art. 31.
98 id.
99 Id.
'
00 Id. art. 31(b).
1' Id. art. 31(c).
102 Id. arts. 3 1(d) and 3 1(e).
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for the supply of the domestic market" of the authorizing
member nation. 10 3  Authorization only lasts until "the
circumstances which led to it cease to exist and are unlikely
to recur," and the continued salience of such circumstances
can be subject to review.' °4  Reasonable compensation
must be paid to the patent owner for use of a patented
invention without permission of its owner. 10 5  Judicial
review must be available for both the governmental
authorization to use a patented invention without
permission of its owner' 0 6 and the reasonableness of the
amount of compensation paid to the patent owner.
1 07
In Doha, Qatar, on November 20, 2001, the WTO issued the
"Declaration on the TRIPS agreement and public health" ("Doha
Declaration") as part of the Doha round of WTO trade negotiations.'
0 8
Though most of its provisions are most relevant to developing
countries, several parts of the Doha Declaration are relevant to the
United States:
We agree that the TRIPS Agreement does not and should
not prevent members from taking measures to protect
public health. Accordingly, while reiterating our
commitment to the TRIPS Agreement, we affirm that the
Agreement can and should be interpreted and implemented
in a manner supportive of WTO members' right to protect
public health and, in particular, to promote access to
medicines for all.
In this connection, we reaffirm the right of WTO
members to use, to the full, the provisions in the TRIPS
Agreement, which provide flexibility for this purpose.
10 9
103 Id. art. 31(f).
104 Id. art. 31 (g).
105 Id. art. 3 1(h).
106 Id. art. 31(i).
107 Id. art. 31(j).
108 World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001,
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, 41 I.L.M. 755 (2002) [hereinafter "Doha Declaration"],
available at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/minist-e/min0 le/mindecltripse.htm (last
visited Jan. 30, 2007).109 1d. 4.
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Furthermore, the Doha Declaration stated that "Each member has the
right to grant compulsory licences and the freedom to determine the
grounds upon which such licences are granted"' 10 and that
Each member has the right to determine what constitutes a
national emergency or other circumstances of extreme
urgency, it being understood that public health crises,
including those relating to HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria
and other epidemics, can represent a national emergency or
other circumstances of extreme urgency."'
3. NAFTA
The NAFTA includes patent provisions relevant to weakening patent
rights that are strikingly similar to that of TRIPS. 1 2 Article 1709(6) of
NAFTA is almost identical to TRIPS Article 30, while Article
1709(10) is almost identical to TRIPS Article 31. One relevant
difference between the two treaties involves revocation or forfeiture of
patent rights. Under NAFTA, a member nation can revoke a patent if
"the grant of a compulsory license has not remedied the lack of
exploitation of the patent." 13 Under TRIPS, any decision to revoke or
render forfeit patent rights must be accompanied by an "opportunity for
judicial review."'' 14
C. Exceptions to Infringement
The statutory subject matter of patents is exceptionally broad. Patented
inventions can include "anything under the sun that is made by
man." 115 Methods of medical treatment fall squarely within this broad
category. Nevertheless, patents claiming many medical treatments are
effectively unenforceable under 35 U.S.C. §287(c).
35 U.S.C. §287(c) states that
11o Id. 5(b).
111Id. 5(c).
112 This is no coincidence, since much of TRIPS is derived, word for word, directly
fiom NAFTA.
113 NAFTA, supra note 75, art. 1709(8)(b).
114 TRIPS, supra note 74, art. 32..
1'5 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980).
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[with] respect to a medical practitioner's performance of a
medical activity that constitutes an infringement under
section 271(a) or (b) of this title, the provisions of sections
281 [availability of a civil action for patent infringement],
283 [availability of injunctive relief for patent
infringement], 284 [availability of damages for patent
infringement], and 285 [availability of attorney fees for
patent infringement] of this title shall not apply against the
medical practitioner or against a related health care entity
with respect to such medical activity.
"Medical activity" is defined as "the performance of a medical activity
or surgical procedure on a body" that does not employ certain patented
materials and methods. 1 6  "Medical practitioner" means a licensed
physician or other supervised medical personnel.' 17 "Related health
care entity" means the medical facility where a medical practitioner
carries out the medical activity.' 1
35 U.S.C. §287(c) approaches the problem of patent liability for
medical treatment methods from a creative angle. Instead of creating a
category of activities that does not constitute infringement, 35 U.S.C.
§287(c) simply removes the possibility of redress for infringement.
Inventors can still apply for, and receive, patents claiming methods of
medical treatment. However, such patents are rendered effectively
unenforceable under 35 U.S.C. §287(c) because physicians, precisely
the group most likely to infringe,'1 9 cannot be sued for damages or
attorney fees or enjoined from committing further infringing acts.
There are several significant exceptions, however. A physician may
still be liable and punishable for patent infringement for "the use of a
patented machine, manufacture, or composition of matter,"'' 20  "the
practice of a patented use of a composition of matter,"' 2' or "the
practice of a process in violation of a biotechnology patent."1
22
The practical effect of 35 U.S.C. §287(c) is to relieve
physicians, ancillary medical staff, and the medical institutions that
116 35 U.S.C. § 287(c)(2)(A) (2000).
117 Id. § 287(c)(2)(B).
' Id. § 287(c)(2)(C).
'19 In fact, because it is generally illegal to practice medicine without a license in the
U.S., physicians may be the only parties who could normally be sued for patent
infringement.
12' 35 U.S.C. § 287(c)(2)(A)(i).
121 Id.
122 Id.
2007]
DEPAUL JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW
host them of much of the fear of liability for sharing and employing
new methods and techniques of medical treatment and surgery. By
reducing the risk of liability, 35 U.S.C. §287(c) promotes the effective
and efficient practice of medicine. The repose provided to medical
personnel also promotes the free exchange of medical ideas and quick
medical intervention on behalf of patients whenever needed.
D. Compulsory Licensing
A patent confers upon its owner a right to exclude others from making,
using, selling, offering to sell, or importing into the United States any
patented invention. 123 A patent owner may voluntarily license others to
practice a patented invention. Alternatively, a patent owner may
choose not to license a patented invention to anyone. 124 As the U.S.
Supreme Court has observed, "[compulsory] licensing is a rarity in our
patent system." 121 In rare circumstances, however, the government
may deem this right to exclude to be outweighed by the need to make a
patented invention more widely available than a patent owner might
wish. Such rare circumstances could certainly include disasters. One
means by which the right to exclude can be loosened is through
compulsory licensing.
As the name suggests, a compulsory license compels a patent
owner to allow certain others to practice the invention otherwise
protected by a patent. In practice, a government acts in the stead of the
patent owner to grant a compulsory license to the government itself or
to a third party authorized by the government. In return, the patent
owner usually receives what the government or courts deem to be a
reasonable royalty. As discussed above, the Paris Convention, TRIPS,
and NAFTA contemplate compulsory licensing and set international
standards for, and limits on, their implementation.
1. Statutory Compulsory Licensing
Compulsory licenses are exceedingly rare in the United States, though
they tend to be considered as more legitimate policy options in other
countries. Congress has provided for compulsory licenses in two
specific instances: air pollution control technology (42 U.S.C. §7608)
and nuclear technology (42 U.S.C. §2183(c)). In the negotiations
123 35 U.S.C. § 271(a).
124 Id. § 271(d)(4).
125 Dawson Chemical v. Rohm and Haas, 448 U.S. 176, 215 (1980).
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preceding the 1952 amendments to the Patent Act, there were some
unsuccessful proposals to provide for a broad compulsory licensing
scheme. 126 Since that time, though Congress has occasionally studied
the issue, it has gone no further.
12
i. The Clean Air Act
In 1970, the U.S. Congress passed major amendments to the Clean Air
Act ("CAA"), 128 which has as one of its primary stated purposes "to
protect and enhance the quality of the Nation's air resources so as to
promote the public health and welfare and the productive capacity of its
population." 129 The CAA recognized that reduction of air pollution is
primarily the responsibility of states and local governments.130 Among
its measures, the CAA mandates that states must reduce the levels of
certain specified air pollutants to or below maximum allowable limits.
To ease the burden of compliance, Congress also passed a provision
allowing states compulsory licenses ("mandatory licenses" in the CAA)
to some air pollution reduction technologies if their use is necessary to
meet federal air quality standards. 131
The compulsory licensing scheme imposes a number of
conditions before a compulsory license can be granted. First, the U.S.
Attorney General must receive a request from the Administrator of the
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency for a compulsory license
allowing governmental or commercial practice, or continued practice,
of a patented invention useful in reducing air pollution. 132  The
Attorney General must then certify that the patented invention is "not
otherwise reasonably available" and "is necessary" to comply with air
quality standards specified by the CAA, 133 "there are no reasonable
alternative methods to accomplish such purpose,"' 134 and failure to grant
126 See STAFF OF H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 81ST CONG., PROPOSED REVISION
AND AMENDMENT OF THE PATENT LAWS: PRELIMINARY DRAFT 91 (Comm. Print
1950).
127 See, e.g., STAFF OF H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 85TH CONG., COMPULSORY
LICENSING OF PATENTS UNDER SOME NON-AMERICAN SYSTEMS 1,2 (Comm. Print
1959).
128 Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, 42 U.S.C. § 7401.
12 9 Id. § 7401(b)(1).
130 Id. § 740 1(a)(3).
131 42 U.S.C. § 7608 (2000).
132 Id § 7608(1)(A).
133 id.
134 Id. § 7608(1)(B).
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a compulsory license will be significantly anticompetitive.' 35
Certification must be made to a district court "which may issue an
order requiring the person who owns such patent to license it on such
reasonable terms and conditions as the court, after hearing, may
determine."'
136
This compulsory licensing was implemented in response to an
important requirement upon the states: compliance with specific air
quality standards mandated by the CAA. Compulsory licensing was
intended to ease the burden upon states successfully to comply.
Disasters almost always present challenges of greater urgency than do
violations of federal air pollution standards. Consequently, if air
quality compliance justifies compulsory licensing of relevant patented
inventions, then compulsory licensing to gain access to patented
inventions is justified afortiori by disasters.
ii. The Clean Air Act
Congress has also established a detailed statutory framework for
compulsory licensing of patented inventions related to nuclear
energy.' 3 7 As a threshold step, the Department of Energy ("DOE")
must, after "giving the patent owner an opportunity for a hearing,"
declare that a patented invention "is of primary importance in the
production or utilization of special nuclear material or atomic energy"
and licensing the patent "is of primary importance to effectuate the
policies and purposes of this chapter."' 38 Once "any patent has been
declared affected with the public interest" the DOE is eligible to be
licensed to use the patented invention itself. 39  Under certain
circumstances, the DOE may also grant nonexclusive licenses to any
third party,140 as long as the latter is authorized to use the patented
invention by the DOE and reveals any previous efforts to obtain a
license from the patent owner. 41  However, before a compulsory
license can be granted to a third party, the DOE must apprise the patent
owner of any compulsory license applications 142 and hold hearings to
3 Id. § 7608(2).
136 id.
137 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2183-2188 (discussing the statutory framework).
13' 42 U.S.C. § 2183(a).
139 Id. § 2183(b).
140 Id. § 2183(b)(2).
141 Id. § 2183(c).
141 Id. § 2183(d)(1).
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consider the applications. 143 If the DOE then makes findings that the
patented invention "is of primary importance in the production or
utilization of special nuclear material or atomic energy,"' 144 licensing
the patented invention "is of primary importance to the conduct of the
activities of the applicant,"'145 the proposed licensed activities "are of
primary importance to the furtherance of policies and purposes of
[Chapter 23146],,"147 and the "applicant cannot otherwise obtain a patent
license from the owner of the patent on terms which the [DOE] deems
to be reasonable for the intended use of the patent to be made by such
applicant,' '14 8 it can then grant the applicant a compulsory license "on
terms deemed equitable by the [DOE] and generally not less fair than
those granted by the patentee or by the [DOE] to similar licensees for
comparable use.' '149 The DOE can also grant a compulsory license on a
patented invention "of primary use in the utilization or production of
special nuclear material or atomic energy" if the patent owner is found
to have engaged in certain antitrust violations.
150
The patent owner is entitled to compensation for any
compulsory license in the form of a "reasonable royalty fee from the
licensee for any use of [the patented invention].'' If the patent owner
and grantee of the compulsory license cannot agree upon a royalty, the
DOE may convene a special "Patent Compensation Board" to assist in
establishing the amount just compensation. 152  In establishing a
reasonable royalty, the DOE must consider the advice of the Patent
Compensation Board, 153 "any defense, general or special, that might be
pleaded by a defendant in an action for infringement,"'' 54 the extent of
federal funding that contributed to the development of the patented
invention,' 55 and "the degree of utility, novelty, and importance [of the
patented invention] and [optionally] the cost to the owner of the patent
of developing.. .or acquiring [the patented invention].' 56
143 Id. § 2183(d).
144 Id. § 2183(e)(1).
145 Id. § 2183(e)(2).
146 Development and Control of Atomic Energy, 42 U.S.C. § 2183.
141 Id. § 2183(3).
148 Id. § 2183(4).
149 Id. § 2183(e).
15'42 U.S.C. § 2188.
151 42 U.S.C. § 2183(g).
152 42 U.S.C. § 2187.
151 Id. § 2187(c)(1)(A).
114 Id. § 2187(c)(1)(B).
155 Id. § 2187(c)(1)(C).
56 Id. § 2187(c)(1)(D).
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Once a compulsory license has been granted by the DOE; a
patent owner cannot obtain an injunction to prevent the use authorized
by the compulsory license. 157 However, a patent owner can bring legal
action to recover unpaid royalty fees. 1
58
2. Defacto Compulsory Licensing
In recent years, upon a showing of patent infringement a patent owner
has been able to obtain a permanent injunction forbidding the allegedly
infringer from committing further infringing acts almost as of right.
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has articulated the
standard for permanent injunctions emphatically:
We therefore see no reason to depart from the general rule
that courts will rule that courts will issue permanent
injunctions against patent infringement absent exceptional
circumstances. 159
However, the U.S. Supreme Court clarified the standard for permanent
injunctions in 2006, overturning the Federal Circuit and bringing the
standard for receiving permanent injunctions in patent infringement
cases into conformance with the standard in other areas of the law.
160
As the Supreme Court wrote, "These familiar principles [governing
permanent injunctions in non-patent law] apply with equal force to
disputes arising under the Patent Act."'16 1  In the absence of the
availability of permanent injunctions as of right, the Supreme Court has
moved the reasonable expectations of patent owners and potential
infringers alike in the direction of a de facto compulsory licensing
regime. It is too early to gauge the significance of this shift in
standards for injunctions, but it may augur well for easier access to
patented inventions needed in disasters.
E. March-in Rights
15742 U.S.C. § 2184.
158 Id.
159 MercExchange, LLC v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3d 1323, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
160 eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC., 126 S. Ct. 1837, 1839 (2006).
161 Id.
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The Bayh-Dole amendments to the patent statute included provisions
allowing so-called "march-in rights."'1 62  March-in rights allow a
federal agency that funded a patented invention to grant a license to the
patent even if the non-governmental entity that holds legal rights to that
patent has failed adequately to put the invention into practice. 1
63
Only inventions whose origins can be traced to funding by a
federal agency are potentially vulnerable to march-in. The federal
government can exercise its march-in rights only under certain
circumstances. For example, march-in could be justified if disaster
struck and the owner of patent rights on an invention needed in time of
disaster had failed to take "effective steps to achieve practical
application" of the invention "within a reasonable time"' 64 or if the
invention were necessary "to alleviate health or safety needs" 165 or "to
meet requirements for public use specified by Federal regulations"'
' 66
not reasonably satisfied by the owner of rights to the invention. 35
U.S.C. §203(a)(3) could be particularly useful in time of disaster if
federal regulations were promulgated specifically contemplating public
use to protect health and safety during disasters.
Several federal agencies have received a number of petitions
requesting that march-in rights be granted in cases involving drugs
deemed overpriced by the petitioners.1 67 However, to date no such
petition has resulted a grant of march-in rights by the federal
government.
F. Patent Breaking
The most extreme option available to the government is total
abrogation or revocation of the rights conferred by a patent. This is
referred to as "breaking" a patent. Immediate patent breaking would
likely violate the Paris Convention because "[forfeiture] of the patent
shall not be provided for except in cases where the grant of compulsory
162 35 U.S.C. §§ 200-212.
163 35 U.S.C. § 203.
164 Id. § 203(a)(1).
165 Id. § 203(a)(2).
166 Id. § 203(a)(3).
167 John H. Raubitschek & Norman J. Latker, Reasonable pricing - A New Twist for
March-In Rights under the Bayh-Dole Act, 22 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH
TECH. L.J. 149, 157-160 (2005).
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licenses would not have been sufficient to prevent [certain] abuses.' 68
Compulsory licensing is a necessary prerequisite because "[no]
proceedings for the forfeiture or revocation of a patent may be
instituted before the expiration of two years from the grant of the first
compulsory license."'1 69  Under the TRIPS and NAFTA agreements
patent breaking would be even more difficult to justify, given the
necessity that "the scope and duration of [government sanctioned] use
shall be limited to the purpose for which it was authorized."' 7 ° Given
the relatively short duration of many disasters, permanent revocation of
patent rights would appear to be a disproportionate response by a
government. Patent breaking is a very rare occurrence, and has not
been employed by the U.S. government in modem times.
1. Anthrax and Cipro®
On September 18, 2001, exactly a week after the 9/11 terrorist attacks,
letters contaminated with anthrax entered the U.S. postal system,
resulting in a number of deaths. 171  Bayer AG, a pharmaceutical
company, had a patent covering ciprofloxacin, or Cipro®, an antibiotic
used to treat anthrax infections, but could not produce enough of the
drug to keep up with the sudden spike in demand. 172 In response, U.S.
Senator Charles Shumer of New York urged the federal government to
purchase Cipro® from generic drug manufacturers to achieve cost
savings and promote enhanced manufacturing capacity. 173  Senator
Shumer's suggestion would have overridden Bayer's patent rights. The
Canadian government did precisely what Senator Shumer had
suggested, and allowed other pharmaceutical companies to produce
Cipro® in violation of Bayer's Canadian patent.
Tommy Thompson, Secretary of Health and Human Services,
initially opposed Senator Shumer's request, in part because he doubted
that the government had the right to disregard patent rights.
174
However, after the Canadian government decided to allow other
168 Paris Convention, supra note 73, art. 5(A)(3).
169 id.
170 TRIPS, supra note 74, art. 3 1(c); NAFTA, supra note 75, art. 1709(10)(c).
171 FBI-Post-9/1 1 Anthrax Summary, at
http://www.fbi.gov/anthrax/amerithraxlinks.htm (last visited Jan. 13, 2007).
172 Anthony York, Is it Time to Bust the Cipro Patent?, SALON, Oct. 18, 2001,
http://archive.salon.com/tech/feature/20O1/10/18/cipro_patent/index.html (last visited
Jan. 13, 2007).
173 id.
174 id.
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pharmaceutical companies to produce Cipro® in violation of Bayer's
Canadian patent, Secretary Thompson changed his tactics:
Thursday morning, October 18, Thompson quickly forgot
about legal technicalities when Canada jumped into the
Cipro fray. The Canadian minister of health signed a
contract with a generic manufacturer to make extra
ciprofloxacin, expressing concerns about the sufficiency of
Canada's stockpile. The next morning, Thompson started
publicly bullying Bayer on price, threatening to get the law
changed so he could ignore the company's patent.
In the end, it was unnecessary for Secretary Thompson to "ignore the
company's patent" because Bayer agreed to lower its price and increase
manufacturing capacity for Cipro® considerably.
175
A similar debate over patented medicines ensued in 2005 and
2006 in response to fears of a global bird flu epidemic, with the
administration of George W. Bush threatening to break the U.S. patent
covering Tamiflu®.176 However, to date the patent licensed to Roche
remains intact.
2. AIDS and Kaletra®
Brazil has used the threat of breaking patents to force Abbott
Laboratories, a drug company, to lower the price it charges for a
combination of anti-retroviral drugs used to treat patients infected with
HIV. 77 Brazil, a developing country with limited financial resources
and an epidemic of AIDS, has a comprehensive AIDS treatment
program that has become a model around the developing world. 178 In
75 Matt Fleischer-Black, The Cipro Dilemma---In the Anthrax Crisis, Tommy
Thompson Distorted Patent Law to Save Public Health. Good Move?, AM. LAW.,
January, 2002, at
http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/cl/cipro/americanlawyer012002.html (last visited
Jan. 13, 2007).
176 Sebastian Mallaby, A Double Dose of Failure, WASH. POST, Nov. 7, 2005,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2005/11/06/AR2005110601013.html (last visited Jan. 13, 2007).
177 Mary Ann Liebert, Brazil, Abbott Reach Tentative Deal on Kaletra, 24
BIOTECHNOLOGY L. REPORT 583, 583-584 (2005).
178 Ubirajara R.Q. Marques, Valeska S. Guimaraes, and Caitlin Sternberg, Brazil's
AIDS Controversy: Antiretroviral Drugs, Breaking, Patents, and Compulsory
Licensing, 60 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 471, 471 (2005) [hereinafter "Brazil's AIDS
Controversy"].
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2005, the Brazilian legislature passed legislation allowing the Brazilian
government to break patents on antiretroviral drugs.' 79  The
government of Brazil had previously threatened to break such patents
unless prices of such drugs were significantly reduced. 180 Under threat
of losing its patent rights in. Brazil, Abbott Laboratories agreed to a
price reduction of $250 million over six years for Kaletra®, its
combination antiretroviral drug.' 8' The head of the World Health
Organization, Jim Kim, had these words of support for Brazil: "The
Brazilian government is perfectly within its rights to suspend the patent
of Kaletra... so as to develop it at more accessible prices.
'' 82
In the end, no patent breaking actually occurred. Indeed, the
mere threat of patent breaking by the Brazilian government appears to
have been sufficient to convince Abbott Laboratories to compromise.
It has even been proposed that Brazil initiated discussion of patent
breaking with the intention of extracting a more favorable price for
Kaletra@. 1
83
Similar disputes have arisen in South Africa and other African
countries over patented antiretroviral drugs, with similar results:
significantly reduced drug prices with no actual patent breaking.'
84
Thailand is notable for having carried through on its threats to break
drug patents; there the military junta that ceased power in 2006 did
break several drug patents, including those covering Kaletra@ and
several other medicines.'
85
G. Sovereign Immunity
1. Federal Sovereign Immunity
179 Liebert, supra note 177, at 583.
180 Brazil's AIDS Controversy, supra note 178, at 474.
181 Liebert, supra note 177, at 583.
182 Philip Thornton, Abbott Laboratories Faced with Anti-Aids Drug Dilemma,
INDEPENDENT, July 4, 2005, at 52.
183 Jonathan Todres, Pamela L. Marcogliese, and Laurel R. Hyle, International Legal
Development in Review: 2005 - Public International Law - International Health
Law, 40 INT'L LAW. 453, 459 (2005).
184 See, e.g., Gumisai Mutume, Health and 'Intellectual Property,' Poor Nations and
Drug Firms Tussle over WTO Patent Provisions, at
http://www.un.'6rg/ecosocdev/geninfo/afrec/vo15no1/151aids8.htrn (last visited Jan.
13, 2007).
185 Financial Times, Abbott pulls HIV drug in Thai patents protest
By Amy Kazmin in Bangkok and Andrew Jack in London, Financial Times
Published: Mar 14, 2007
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Under the doctrine of sovereign immunity, the federal government
possesses the constitutional authority to infringe U.S. patents without
the usual penalties. 86  Furthermore, the federal government can
authorize others to do the same.' 87 However, by federal statute patent
owners can seek some redress for infringement of a patented invention
by the federal government or those it has authorized. Under 28 U.S.C.
§1498(a)
Whenever an invention described in and covered by a
patent of the United States is used or manufactured by or
for the United States without license of the owner thereof
or lawful right to use or manufacture the same, the owner's
remedy shall be by action against the United States in the
United States Court of Federal Claims for the recovery of
his reasonable and entire compensation -for such' use and
manufacture.
For the purposes of this section, the use or manufacture of
an invention described in and covered by a patent of the
United States by a contractor, a subcontractor, or any
person, firm, or corporation for the Government and with
the authorization or consent of the Government, shall be
construed as use or manufacture for the United States.
Thus, the United States possesses very broad discretion about when and
how to manufacture or use, or authorize to manufacture or use, patented
inventions.
The federal government in general, federal agencies in specific,
and any nongovernmental personnel or entities authorized by the
federal government, can manufacture or make use of any patented
inventions. Although the owner of any patented invention
manufactured or used in this manner can sue in the United States Court
of Federal Claims to recover "reasonable and entire compensation for
such use and manufacture," neither injunctive relief, willful damages,
nor attorney fees are available. It is fortunate for patent owners that
Congress allows patent owners to seek some compensation from the
United States under 28 U.S.C. §1498; otherwise, patent owners have
few alternative legal avenues to pursue compensation from the federal
186 W.L. Gore & Associates, Inc. v. Garlock, Inc., 842 F.2d 1275, 1282-83 (Fed. Cir.
1988).
187 28 U.S.C. §1498(a).
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government. As the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has
observed, "The government has graciously consented, in [28 U.S.C.
§1498], to be sued in the Claims Court for reasonable and entire
compensation, for what would be infringement if by a private
person.
2. State Sovereign Immunity
The sovereign immunity of states is less forgiving to patent owners
than federal sovereign immunity. Congress attempted to remove from
states their immunity to patent infringement suits by patent owners by
amending the patent statute to add 35 U.S.C. §271(h). The amendment
stipulated that "Any State, and any... instrumentality, officer, or
employee [of the State] shall be subject to the provisions of [the patent
statute] in the same manner and to the same extent as any
nongovernmental entity." 
89
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit upheld the
constitutionality of 35 U.S.C. §271(h) in authorizing a patent owner to
bring suit against a state for infringing a patented invention. 190
However, the United States Supreme Court disagreed, instead finding
that 35 U.S.C. §271(h) violated the Eleventh Amendment. 91 Thus,
states do retain some sovereign immunity against suits alleging patent
infringement.
Under the protection of the sovereign immunity conferred by
the Eleventh Amendment, a state may be permitted to engage in
activities that, but for sovereign immunity, would constitute patent
infringement. The sovereign immunity of state governments extends to
their instrumentalities and employees. In the face of such infringement,
patent owners currently have little effective recourse.
IV. ENHANCING PATENT RIGHTS
188 Id.
189 35 U.S.C. § 271(h).
190 College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Ed. Expense Bd., 148 F.3d
1343, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
191 Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Ed. Expense Bd. v. College Savings Bank, 527 U.S.
627, 647 (1999). "The Eleventh Amendment states that "The Judicial power of the
United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity,
commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another
State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State" Id.
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The patent system provides an economic incentive that promotes
innovation. One strategy for increasing the technological capacity of
society to face disasters would be to increase the strength of patent
incentives, thus promoting even greater innovation. There is economic
evidence that, as investments in technological innovation increase,
economic growth increases without a declining return on investment.
1 92
Similarly, economic welfare appears to continue increasing indefinitely
alongside technological innovation. 93  Enhanced patent incentives
could be employed to increase both the general and specific
technological capacity of society.
A. International Law and Enhancing Patent Rights
The Paris Convention, TRIPS, and NAFTA mandate that all member
nations maintain at least a minimum level of patent protection. Both
TRIPS Article 27(1) and NAFTA Article 1709(1) require member
nations to allow patents "for any inventions, whether products or
processes, in all fields of technology" except for the specific categories
of subject matter specified in TRIPS Article 27(2) and (3) and NAFTA
Article 1709(2) and (3). TRIPS Article 33 sets aIminimum patent term
of twenty years from a patent's filing date, while NAFTA Article
1709(12) sets the minimum patent term at either twenty years from a
patent's filing date or seventeen years from a patent's date of grant.
NAFTA Article 1709(12) also allows a member nation to "extend the
term of patent protection, in appropriate cases, to compensate for
delays caused by regulatory approval processes."'1 94 Under all three
international agreements, member nations are free to offer greater
levels of protection for patents than the mandatory minimum levels.
B. Patent Term Extension
Obtaining a patent can be a lengthy undertaking.' 95 When the USPTO
causes an unreasonable amount of delay in granting a patent, a patent
applicant can apply to have the term of a patent extended to
192 See Paul M. Romer, Increasing Return and Long-Run Growth, 94 J. POL. ECON.
1002 (1986) (discussing the economic evidence).
' See, e.g., FTC REPORT, supra note 67.
194 NAFTA, supra note 75, art. 1709(12).
195 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT, supra note 48.
However, the average pendency times estimated by the USPTO are likely
underestimates. Osenga, supra note 48, at 129.
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compensate for such delay. 19 6 Similarly, the term of a patent can be
extended to compensate for regulatory approval by the Food and Drug
Administration. 197
C. Wild-card Patenting
In the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, U.S. Senators Joseph
Lieberman and Orrin Hatch proposed a bill named "Bioshield II.:
198
Alongside Bioshield II's aims of enhancing industry research into new
vaccines and drugs useful against terrorist attacks, the bill included a
very creative provision for "wildcard patenting."' 199 Wildcard patenting
would allow the owner of a new invention certified by the federal
government as useful against bioterrorism to extend the term of any
other patent in the owner's portfolio of patents for up to two years.
20 0
Such a scheme could provide a significant incentive for companies to
invest research and development efforts in bioterrorism, because, by
doing so, the companies could potentially extend the term of a lucrative
patent and thereby reap a windfall of monopoly profits. As U.S.
Representative Henry Waxman complained,
"In other words, if Pfizer developed and obtained approval
of a countermeasure, it could obtain a two-year patent
extension on Lipitor," he noted. "With U.S. sales of $7.7
last year, a two-year patent extension on Lipitor would be
worth over $10 billion to Pfizer."20 1
The Bioshield II bill has since been replaced by another bill that lacks
provision for wildcard patenting.
196 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)-(c) (2000).
197 35 U.S.C. § 155 (2000).
198 Ted Agres, Cell Culture Breaks Some Eggs, 9 DRUG DISCOVERY & DEV. 14, 14
(2006). Bioshield II was intended to be a complement to The Project BioShield Act
of 2004, Public Law No. 108-276. The BioShield Act of 2004 provided funding and
incentives for the development of new defenses against bioterrorism. See, e.g., Frank
Rapoport, Christopher C. Bouquet, and Scott Flukinger, Project BioShield Act of
2004: Dawn of a New Industry?, 40 SPG PROCUREMENT L. 3, 3 (2005).
199 Agres, supra note 197, at 14.
200 Id.
201 Chain Drug Review, Bioshield Legislation Would 'Increase Cost of Drugs', 27
CHAIN DRUG REV. 66, 66 (2005).
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V. THE PATENT SYSTEM TO THE RESCUE IN
DISASTERS
Many patented inventions can be of assistance in disasters. Patent law
allows a diverse set of policy options through which the patent system
can ensure that society has access to those patented inventions needed
in disasters. Among these options are exceptions to infringement for
certain specified actions, compulsory licensing, march-in rights, patent
breaking, and sovereign immunity. However, in deciding among these
options one must bear in mind not just the immediate benefits of having
access to needed technology, but also the longer term prospective
effects that particular options may have on developing new beneficial
technology in the future. Unless the interests of society in dealing with
disasters that occur in the near term are judiciously balanced with its
interests in dealing with disasters in the future, society risks harming
technological capacity tomorrow in favor of access to patented
technology today.
Optimal policy options for harnessing the patent system will be
different for foreseeable disasters than for surprise disasters. Most
significantly, the options available to society for dealing with
foreseeable disasters are many, while those available to deal with
surprise disasters are fewer. Furthermore, what constitutes a reasonable
use of the patent system in a surprise disaster may be unreasonable in
response to a foreseeable disaster.
What follows is a modest proposal for how the patent system
might best be used by society to deal with disasters, bearing in mind the
need to ensure continued improvements in both general and specific
technological capacity, the existing structure of international and U.S.
patent law, the divergent considerations of the near and far terms, and
the salient differences in approach required by foreseeable and surprise
disasters.
A. Disaster Method Patenting
In 1998, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit formally endorsed
methods of doing business as patentable subject matter.2 °2 Business
method patents can range from a system for implementing an
investment strategy to an arrangement of furniture, art, and magazines
in a physician's waiting room. The main limits on what business
202 State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1376
(Fed. Cir. 1998).
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methods can potentially be patented are those imposed by human
creativity. Since 1998 there has been a flood of patent applications
claiming business methods.
20 3
Although business methods may not always be highly
technological in nature, they possess the potential to be particularly
useful in dealing with disasters. Furthermore, this category of patents
does not necessarily have to be related to business per se. As the
experience of Hurricane Katrina demonstrated, new and useful methods
of efficiently and effectively evacuating populations from areas
affected by disasters have the potential to save many human lives.
Inventions such as evacuation methods might be termed "disaster
method patents." Like business method patents, as long as a disaster
method invention satisfies all of the statutory requirements of patent
law, it should be patentable.
A challenge to promoting the invention of new disaster methods
involves the economic rewards expected by inventors. A disaster
method would be most useful, and employed most often, during a
disaster, a time when the prospect of patent enforcement ebbs
especially low. Nevertheless, patent owners could still seek
compensation for infringement, compulsory licensing, or invocation of
federal sovereign immunity involving disaster method patents, just as
they could for other types of patents.
B. Enhancing Patent Rights for Disaster Technology
1. Patent Term Extension
Patent term extension is relevant to disasters in two respects. Patent
term extension could be extended by the federal government to
patented inventions that are particularly useful in disasters. With the
prospect of even longer periods during which they can exclude others
and receive monopoly profits for their inventions, inventors will tend to
increase their inventive efforts on innovative solutions to problems
caused by disasters. The result will tend to be more inventions useful
in disasters. Such an enhanced incentive to invent would be most
203 See, e.g., Robert P. Merges, As Many as Six Possible Patents before Breakfast:
Property Rights for Business Concepts and Patent System Reform, 14 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 577 (1999).
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useful in the case of foreseeable disasters. On the other hand, if patent
rights are weakened or abrogated during a disaster, the temporary loss
of the right to exclude others could be compensated, at least in part, by
extending the term of the weakened patent commensurate with the
period of weakened rights.
2. Wild-Card Patenting
A wildcard patenting system, such as that proposed for BioShield II,
could create a very strong incentive for companies to invent and
develop new technologies useful in disasters. Companies with existing
patent portfolios, and significant inventive capacities, would be
particularly attracted to the possibility of wild-card patenting as a
means of extending the terms of their most valuable patents. Given the
potential windfall of securing a wild-card patent, the government would
be well advised to institute a rigorous certification process to ensure
that the technological innovations spurred by the wild-card incentive
were commensurate with the economic value of extending patent terms.
One approach might be for the Federal Emergency Management
Agency ("FEMA") to identify particular challenges caused by disasters,
and for the USPTO to agree to award wild-card patents to inventors
that successfully develop solutions to these challenges. This approach
would be most effective in the case of foreseeable disasters.
C. Weakening Patent Rights in Disasters
1. Exceptions to Infringement
In disasters, 35 U.S.C. §287(c) would be extremely useful. It allows
physicians, other medical staff, and medical facilities to be relatively
unfettered in delivering medical services to patients in need of medical
attention, instead of having to waste valuable time and effort ordering
their medical or surgical conduct so as best to avoid the possibility of
infringing patent rights. Relief from infringement removes
disincentives against participation in disaster relief activities, thus
20071
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allowing vital participation in disaster response by medical personnel
and institutions.
Amending this provision of the patent statute even further, to
eliminate liability during emergencies for the activities enumerated in
35 U.S.C. §287(c)(2)(A)(i)-(iii) would allow medical personnel and
institutions to be even more useful in disasters, as it would make a
broader array of materials, drugs, and equipment available to treat those
harmed in disasters.
In addition, 35 U.S.C. §287(c) could serve as a model for new
legislation to create a similar exception to infringement for necessary
relief activities carried out by any emergency personnel and institutions
during disasters. Such an exception to infringement would facilitate the
delivery of disaster assistance even when that assistance involves
otherwise infringing patented methods. Although such an amendment
to the patent statute could certainly prospectively weaken incentives to
create inventions useful in disasters, narrow tailoring to cover only
FEMA-certified emergencies and emergency personnel could help
minimize harm to patent rights, especially those relating to inventions
also useful in contexts other than disasters.
2. Weakening Patent Rights in Foreseeable Disasters
Foreseeable disasters allow society the best opportunity to plan well for
the arrival of specific types of disasters. Along with policies that
enhance general technological capacity, knowledge about the
approaching disaster allows society to deploy policy options aimed' at
enhancing technological capacity that is specifically relevant to that
disaster. To enhance specific capacity, inventors could be offered the
prospect of extended patent terms, wild-card patents, or even expedited
examination within the USPTO for areas of technology likely to help
society in an approaching disaster. The greater the advance warning
and the amount of information known about what challenges a disaster
will pose to health, safety, and property, the more effectively specific
technological capacity can be enhanced ahead of the disaster.
Foreseeability gives society the opportunity to identify existing
patented inventions of potential use in an approaching disaster. Rather
than wait until the disaster arrives, governments could negotiate with
patent owners to acquire access to these inventions. If the patented
invention in question is a good (for example, a composition, such as a
drug, or a device, such as a water-purifier), the easiest approach might
be for the government to purchase a sufficient stockpile of the good to
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be deployed in a disaster when needed. Under the doctrine of "first
sale," or "patent exhaustion," after purchasing a patented good the
purchaser of that good requires no further permission from the patent
owner to use that good; the right to exclude others is exhausted by the
sale.2 °4 On the other hand, if the patented invention in question is a
method, stockpiling will not be possible. Instead, the government
could negotiate ahead of time for a voluntary license to use the method.
Since the price of a license tends to vary with the breadth of the rights it
includes, the most cost-effective license might include a narrow field of
use restricted only to disasters.
The government could choose to avail itself of the more
extreme policy options of exclusions to infringement, compulsory
licensing, march-in rights, patent breaking, or invocation of sovereign
immunity. However, such extreme measures would tend to harm the
prospective incentives for engaging in inventive activity. Even worse,
rational inventors would tend to avoid inventive activity likely to result
in inventions useful in disasters. The result would be an erosion of
future general and specific technological capacity.
Avoidance of extreme measures in favor of voluntary measures,
respect for patent rights, and good planning ahead of foreseeable
disasters could best balance access to patented inventions needed in
disasters with the preservation of prospective incentives to create,
which, in turn, would enhance both general and specific technological
capacity. Unless the constraints of the political process precluded it,
this approach could best balance the interests of the government,
inventors, patent owners, and those affected by disasters.
3. Weakening Patent Rights in Surprise Disasters
Surprise disasters are extreme events that may require extreme
responses. By their very nature, surprise disasters cannot be prepared
for in any specific way. The best preparation society can make with
respect to the patent system is to ensure that it provides sufficient
incentives to enhance general technological capacity. Increasing
general technological capacity raises the probability that at least some
innovations will prove useful in disasters, even if it is difficult to
predict which particular innovations these will be. Negotiating
voluntary licensing agreements with patent owners or stockpiling
204 See, e.g., Jazz Photo Corp. v. Int'l. Trade Comm'n., 264 F.3d 1094, 1109-1111
(Fed. Cir. 2001).
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patented goods will tend to be inefficient given the lack of advance
information about which particular technology should be licensed or
purchased.
Consequently, in surprise disasters it may be reasonable for
governments to make use of more extreme policy options, such as
exclusions from infringement, compulsory licensing, march-in rights,
or sovereign immunity. However, it would be advisable for
governments to exercise these options in as prudent a manner as
possible so as to comply with obligations imposed by international
treaties and U.S. patent law, as well as to minimize prospective damage
to the patent system. To accomplish this, governments could borrow
and adapt some provisions and principles of existing international and
U.S. patent law.
To facilitate the rapid and efficient implementation of
compulsory licenses to patented inventions needed in surprise disasters,
Congress could authorize a compulsory licensing system for patents
covering such inventions. As a model, Congress could use the
statutory compulsory licensing frameworks already implemented for air
pollution technology 0 5 and nuclear technology.20 6 However, given the
urgency created by surprise disasters, the new statute would work best
if the process of obtaining compulsory licenses was more streamlined
than the existing statutory schemes for licensing air pollution
technology and nuclear technology.
As a threshold step, the head of FEMA could be mandated to
certify which particular patented inventions were necessary for dealing
with particular surprise disasters. Once certified, FEMA could provide
notice of such certification to affected patent owners, and request a
voluntary license for whatever field of use and period of time was
required. Given the need for rapid response, the patent owner would
have to conclude voluntary negotiations very rapidly, though precise
deadlines would vary with the circumstances of particular disasters. In
the case of a patent owner unwilling to agree to voluntarily license the
needed patented invention by the appointed deadline, FEMA should
have statutory authority to take for itself, or grant to a third party under
its authorization, a compulsory license to make, use, or import the
patented invention.
Any compulsory license should comport with principles of
international patent law. The scope and duration of use "shall be
205 42 U.S.C. § 7608.
206 42 U.S.C. § 2183(c).
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limited to the purpose for which it was authorized. ' '2 07  Any
compulsory license must be nonexclusive and essentially
nontransferable. 20 8 Authorization would extend "predominantly for the,, • 209
supply of the domestic market" of the United States. And,
authorization would only last until "the circumstances which led to it
cease to exist and are unlikely to recur."2 10  Once the compulsory
license was granted, FEMA could then proceed to practice the needed
invention to deal with the surprise disaster.
To minimize harm to the prospective incentive to invent, FEMA
should establish a "Patent Compensation Board" similar to that
established by 42 U.S.C. §2187 for nuclear energy inventions. The
patent owner of the compulsorily licensed invention could apply to the
Patent Compensation Board for compensation. At the very least a
patent owner should be compensated with a reasonable royalty.
However, this level of compensation would generally be inadequate to
compensate for the loss of the core of the patent grant: the right to
exclude others. To minimize prospective harm to the patent system, the
patent owner should also be compensated for the loss of this important
right. Consequently, to make the patent owner whole, the total amount
of damages due to any patent owner should be "reasonable and entire
compensation, ' ,2 11  including a reasonable royalty, additional
compensation to reflect the loss of the right to exclude others, costs,
and attorney fees.
212
Since any compulsory license should not extend much longer
than the duration of the surprise disaster and its aftermath, even this
level of full compensation would tend not to be an unreasonable burden
on government resources, especially when compared with other costs
associated with the disaster. Furthermore, full compensation would
accomplish two vital goals: it would make whole any individual patent
owners with inventions subjected to compulsory licenses; and, it would
preserve the prospective incentive to invent created by the availability
of patent rights by signaling to potential inventors that, even if patented
inventions useful in disasters were ever compulsorily licensed, such
incursions on their patent rights would be fully compensated. Patent
207 TRIPS, supra note 74, art. 31 (c); NAFTA, supra note 75, art. 1709(10)(c).
208 Paris Convention, supra note 73, art. 5(A)(4); TRIPS, supra note 74, arts. 3 1(d)
and 31(e); NAFTA, supra note 75, arts. 1709(10)(d) and 1709(10)(t).
209 TRIPS, supra note 74, art. 31(f); NAFTA, supra note 75, art. 1709(10)(f).
210 TRIPS, supra note 74, art. 3 1(g); NAFTA, supra note 75, art. 1709(10)(g).
211 Cf Garlock, Inc., 842 F.2d at 1283 (discussing the total amount of damages).
212 42 U.S.C. § 2187.
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owners whose inventions were compulsorily licensed could be
authorized to pursue their claims for compensation not only to the
administrative Patent Compensation Board, but also in a federal district
court in the district most convenient to them.213
One caveat to the process outlined above involves very young
patents. Under the Paris Convention, absent a finding of "abuse" other
than "failure to work or insufficient working," compulsory licenses can
be granted only after a "period of four years from the date of filing of
the patent application or three years from the date of the grant of the
patent, whichever period expires last."2 4 Considered in isolation,
forcing a compulsory license on very young patents in the face of these
restrictions would appear to violate the Paris Convention. However,
the provisions of the later NAFTA and TRIPS mollified the obligation
to negotiate with the patent owner "in the case of a national emergency
or other circumstances of extreme urgency or in cases of public
noncommercial use.",2 15 Furthermore, the Doha Declaration, which
constitutes an official interpretation of TRIPS, stated that "[each]
member has the right to grant compulsory licences and the freedom to
determine the grounds upon which such licences are granted."
216
Viewed in the context of later international patent treaties, the
provisions of the Paris Convention regarding compulsory licenses to
very young patents may not constitute a significant barrier in disasters.
Even in surprise disasters, the need to engage in breaking
patents would seldom arise because well regulated compulsory
licensing could accomplish sufficient access to patented inventions
needed in disasters. Unless compulsory licensing were indeed
insufficient, patent breaking could violate both NAFTA and TRIPS,
which both state that "the scope and duration of [government
sanctioned] use shall be limited to the purpose for which it was
authorized. , 2 17 Even if patent breaking were employed as a means to
gain access to a patented invention, compensation would probably still
have to be paid to patent owners, and this compensation might have to
be in a greater amount than for compulsory licensing, given the greater
magnitude of damage done by breaking, rather than merely licensing, a
patent. Patent breaking would also be more harmful than compulsory
213 Id.
214 Paris Convention, supra note 73, art. 5(A)(4).
215 TRIPS, supra note 74, art. 3 1(b); NAFTA, supra note 75, art. 1709(b).
216 Doha Declaration, supra note 108, 5(b).
217 TRIPS, supra note 74, art. 3 1(c); NAFTA, supra note 75, art. 1709(c).
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licensing to prospective patent incentives to invent, thus harming future
general and specific technological capacity.
Neither would sovereign immunity, invoked by either the state
or federal government, tend to provide significant additional benefits
compared to a rapid, flexible, and measured compulsory licensing
regime. In the case of federal sovereign immunity, "reasonable and
entire compensation" would still be available to patent owners.21 8
States could probably use sovereign immunity to avoid compensation
for practicing patented inventions. However, interference with patent
rights without compensation would do serious harm to the prospective
patent incentive to invent, again harming both general and specific
technological capacity in the future.
On balance, the best policy option for gaining access to need
patented inventions in disasters would be a reasonable system of
compulsory licensing, relying on government certification, narrow time
and field of use limits, and reliable procedures for ensuring full
compensation to patent owners for any loss to their patent rights. Such
a system would best ensure both timely access to existing patented
inventions needed in surprise disasters and preservation of prospective
patent incentives to support a strong and productive patent system
capable of delivering significant amounts of additional technological
innovations useful in future disasters.
CONCLUSIONS
The patent system can play a vital role in preparing for, mitigating,
reacting to, and preventing disasters. In the far term, it ensures that
society continually improves its technological capacity to deal with
disasters. In the near term, the patent system includes a diversity of
legal options for ensuring access to patented inventions needed in
disasters. Foreseeable and surprise disasters require different legal
approaches to ensure timely access to patented inventions while
ensuring that society is able to continue enhancing both its general and
specific technological capacities. Accomplishing optimal results
requires careful balancing of far term and near term interests, respect
for both international and U.S. patent law, a clear understanding of the
interrelation of different aspects of patent law, insight into the
incentives that drive technological innovation, and appreciation of the
disparate challenges posed by different kinds of disasters. When
218 Cf Garlock, Inc., 842 F.2d at 1283.
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employed wisely, the patent system can offer society powerful
assistance to prevent, prepare for, and mitigate disasters.
